The clearest recurring weakness is simple: Medicaid agencies often do not translate eligibility changes into timely managed care enrollment and payment actions. Across 36 managed-care-related reports and 183 findings, delayed processing of deaths, incarceration, out-of-state residence, concurrent enrollment, and other eligibility changes repeatedly allowed capitation payments to continue after eligibility should have changed or ended.
This is the broadest recurring payment-integrity pattern, with several of the largest identified exposures. The reports also show that financial risk is not confined to enrollment: auditors found payment-adjudication errors, unreliable medical loss ratio (MLR) and rate-setting data, weak corrective-action governance, and incomplete oversight of access and beneficiary protections.
The evidence includes confirmed improper or unallowable payments in several audits—for example, approximately $14 million in Maryland incarceration-related capitation payments, $11.8 million and $8.3 million in New York premium overpayments in successive review periods, and $263,186 for incarcerated Illinois enrollees. Separately, Maryland identified $10.4 million in potentially improper newborn supplemental payments requiring investigation and, where warranted, recovery; it should not be treated as a confirmed improper-payment amount. High-dollar residency and concurrent-enrollment figures likewise frequently describe potentially improper, estimated, or overlapping payment populations.
For audit leaders, the priority is an end-to-end control test: whether external eligibility information reaches the eligibility system, whether exceptions are resolved promptly, whether capitation stops when required, and whether improper payments are recovered. That test should be complemented by reconciliation of plan financial reporting, rate-setting inputs, service-access oversight, and corrective-action closure.
In Medicaid managed care, states generally pay managed care organizations (MCOs) a periodic capitation payment for enrolled beneficiaries. That arrangement makes enrollment accuracy a payment control: an unprocessed death record, incarceration notice, address change, third-party coverage update, or interstate enrollment match can trigger continuing payments even when the enrollee’s status has changed.
The risk is not only whether a payment was made. Agencies must also determine whether plan-reported costs are properly classified, whether rates are based on valid data, whether claims and supplemental payments are supported, and whether beneficiaries can obtain covered services. Audits show that a control may exist on paper but still fail in the handoff between data matching, review, system updates, payment processing, recovery, and supervisory follow-up.
This review covers 36 reports published from 2018 through 2025, with 183 findings. It includes federal reviews by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services Office of Inspector General (OIG), the Government Accountability Office (GAO), and the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services (CMS), alongside state audit reports.
The evidence distinguishes among direct findings of improper or unallowable payments, estimated or potentially improper amounts requiring verification, and contextual program-spending figures. Those categories are not interchangeable and are not combined into a single total.
Supported by 52 findings in 12 reports; this is the broadest theme in the review. The recurring problem was less about a lack of data than failure to act reliably on available data. New York’s Comptroller found that the Department of Health began reviewing New York State of Health Public Assistance Reporting Information System (PARIS) matches more than five years after enrollments began; premiums were paid for members who may have lived outside the state [Report 124]. Missouri’s State Auditor found that manual eligibility bypasses prevented normal deactivation controls from ending eligibility, including for beneficiaries who moved out of state or became incarcerated [Report 79].
National reviews demonstrate the pattern is not isolated. The OIG’s multistate concurrent-enrollment review found that all 47 states examined made capitation payments for beneficiaries concurrently enrolled in two states, while CMS did not actively monitor such enrollment or provide states national matching data [Report 40]. A separate OIG review found that death-date information was missing, unavailable in Medicaid systems despite being available elsewhere, or not used to update eligibility [Report 118]. Maryland identified approximately $14 million in improper capitation payments for incarcerated individuals during fiscal years 2019 through 2022 [Report 84].
The control failure is therefore end-to-end: match, investigate, update enrollment, stop payment, and pursue recovery.
Supported by 22 findings in seven reports across four jurisdictions. New York’s Comptroller identified $11.8 million in improper managed care premiums tied to untimely disenrollment for beneficiaries with comprehensive third-party insurance during October 2023 through March 2024 [Report 53]. In the following review period, the same issue produced $8.3 million in identified improper premiums, while fee-for-service inpatient payments continued for beneficiaries with managed care coverage [Report 54].
Other payment weaknesses involved specialized claims and reporting. Maryland’s Office of Legislative Audits found that the agency had not investigated or recovered $10.4 million in potentially improper newborn-delivery supplemental payments to MCOs [Report 84]. That amount requires claim-level investigation before being characterized as improper. In Texas, the State Auditor found that a pharmacy benefit manager’s methodology omitted returned funds from encounter reporting and did not isolate the Medicaid-specific share of transactions, impairing validation of reported pharmacy expenses [Report 7].
These findings show how enrollment defects, weak claim edits, incomplete documentation, and opaque plan reporting can compound one another.
Supported by 37 findings in eight reports examining six state programs—Washington, Ohio, Oregon, Illinois, Maryland, and Texas. Across these audits, inaccurate MLR classifications, incomplete encounter data, late reconciliations, and weak validation of MCO financial submissions reduced assurance over rate setting and remittance decisions.
CMS found that Washington’s MLR reporting inaccurately treated state-directed and special payments and inconsistently handled incentive payments, nonclaims costs, and payments outside the managed care contract [Report 121]. Ohio’s CMS MLR audit found reporting-template and submission errors involving taxes, quality-improvement activity expenses, and risk-corridor settlements [Report 11]. Oregon’s CMS audit similarly identified issues involving special payments, third-party vendor data, expense allocation, and quality-improvement expenditures [Report 18].
Rate-setting reviews exposed a related timing problem. Maryland lacked sufficiently comprehensive validation of MCO expenditure data used in capitation-rate calculations [Report 84]. Texas found that agreed-upon procedures and year-end reconciliations were not completed in time to inform rate setting, and results were not consistently communicated to actuarial staff [Report 114]. The risk is not necessarily a current improper payment; it is that unreliable financial inputs can embed error into future rates.
Supported by 28 findings in seven reports across four jurisdictions. Audits often found that agencies had oversight bodies, audit plans, or monitoring tools, but lacked consistent risk prioritization, ownership, documentation, and validation of corrective action.
The OIG assessed North Carolina’s Medicaid control environment as moderate risk overall and identified high risk in internal-control adoption and compliance monitoring [Report 56]. Washington’s State Auditor found that the Health Care Authority had not provided federally required oversight of sister agencies’ Medicaid program-integrity efforts and needed more risk-based audit selection [Report 33]. GAO found inconsistent CMS oversight of the Medicaid Recovery Audit Contractor program, including monitoring of state-plan-amendment expiration dates and effectiveness reporting [Report 17].
Texas illustrates the implementation gap: the State Auditor found that the Commission needed to improve execution of planned performance audits, corrective-action processes, and use of external quality review organization information [Report 26]. An audit program without documented closure testing is not a complete control.
Supported by 23 findings in six reports across five jurisdictions. These findings address beneficiary harm rather than only financial loss. New York’s Comptroller found inaccurate network-deficiency records, inconsistent status updates, and limited use of network-review data to identify recurring problems [Report 123]. The OIG found that all eight states in its parity review lacked required mental health and substance use disorder parity provisions in MCO contracts by the compliance date [Report 43].
In a New York prior-authorization audit, 35 of 70 sampled denials contained incorrect information in denial notices; resulting access delays had a median of 75 days and reached 282 days in one case [Report 9]. California’s State Auditor found that nonexclusive billing codes and incomplete data collection prevented meaningful measurement of comprehensive perinatal-service use [Report 39]. Florida also found incomplete documentation of supervisory review and inconsistent compliance-action forms for complaint and grievance oversight [Report 112].
The common issue is not merely missing reports. It is the inability to verify whether service obligations were met and deficiencies corrected.
Based on a single detailed Louisiana audit. Louisiana’s Legislative Auditor found that managed care incentive-payment funds supported activities not directly tied to measurable access, quality, or health-outcome improvement [Report 104]. The audit also found inconsistent quality-network structures and milestones, substantial use of funds for non-incentive activities, and insufficient monitoring of how MCOs and quality networks used funds.
Because this is a one-report theme, it should not be generalized as a cross-state pattern. Still, it provides a high-value audit model: test each incentive payment’s contractual purpose, measurable milestone, support for expenditure, and independently verified beneficiary outcome.
Supported by two federal reports. GAO reported that CMS’s managed-care improper-payment estimate had been at or near zero in recent years but did not capture all program-integrity risks, including services not provided, ineligible providers, and insufficient documentation [Report 12]. GAO also noted gaps in provider screening, prepayment review, and fraud-prevention implementation [Report 27].
The implication is practical: a favorable reported improper-payment rate does not substitute for targeted testing of enrollment, payment, provider, and documentation risks.
The evidence points to a connected control architecture rather than separate operational problems. Enrollment data that is not timely matched and resolved produces improper capitation risk; incomplete payment and encounter data then weaken recovery, rate setting, and plan oversight. If corrective-action systems do not assign owners, deadlines, and validation standards, the same weaknesses can recur across payment integrity and beneficiary protection.
A second pattern is the gap between detection and resolution. Several audits found agencies identifying matches, claims, deficiencies, or monitoring results but not consistently converting them into eligibility changes, payment adjustments, recoveries, sanctions, or verified corrective actions. The critical measure is therefore not how many exceptions a system generates, but how reliably the agency closes the loop.
Financial amounts in this evidence base are heterogeneous and nonadditive. They include confirmed improper or unallowable payments, estimated exposures, potentially improper payments requiring verification, recovered amounts, and broader program context. No headline total is presented.
Confirmed improper or unallowable payments. Maryland identified approximately $14 million in improper capitation payments for incarcerated beneficiaries during fiscal years 2019–2022 [Report 84]. New York identified $11.8 million in improper premiums in one six-month review period and $8.3 million in the following six-month period, both tied to delayed disenrollment for third-party coverage [Report 53] [Report 54]. An Illinois OIG audit identified $263,186 in unallowable capitation payments for 48 incarcerated enrollees [Report 119]. Prior OIG audits across 14 states identified approximately $248.6 million in unallowable capitation payments after enrollee deaths; this is a multistate historical figure, not an amount to combine with state-specific findings [Report 42].
Estimated or potentially improper amounts requiring verification. An OIG review estimated $207.5 million in unallowable capitation payments after deaths based on extrapolation from 49 payments [Report 118]. Maryland’s $10.4 million in newborn supplemental payments was identified as potentially improper and requires investigation and recovery only where claims prove improper [Report 84]. New York’s $1.5 billion out-of-state-residency figure concerns premiums for members who may have resided outside New York and likewise requires residency determination before recovery [Report 124].
The following procedures are synthesized from source-audit recommendations. They are not presented as verbatim recommendations from any single audit.
- Reperform the enrollment-to-capitation reconciliation monthly. Match death, incarceration, residency, interstate-enrollment, address, and eligibility-closure data to capitation records; test match aging, disposition, enrollment action, payment cessation, and recovery initiation. This is the top priority because it addresses the broadest payment-integrity pattern [Reports 40, 42, 79, 84, 118, 119, 124].
- Test payments around coverage transitions. Select premiums and fee-for-service claims near retroactive enrollment, third-party insurance updates, births, incarceration, and disenrollment. Verify eligibility, coverage, claim support, duplicate-payment edits, adjustments, and recovery status [Reports 53, 54, 84].
- Reconcile MLR submissions to underlying evidence. Test each MCO’s MLR submission against general-ledger balances, claims detail, state-directed and special-payment schedules, accruals, runout support, pharmacy benefit manager or subcontractor support, and state payment records. Assess numerator and denominator classification rules [Reports 11, 18, 121].
- Test the rate-setting control timeline. Trace financial-statistical-report submission through agreed-upon procedures, reconciliation, actuarial review, exception resolution, and final approval. Verify that actuaries receive validated data before rates are finalized [Reports 84, 114].
- Audit corrective-action governance. Inspect the risk assessment, audit plan, MCO oversight universe, and corrective-action register. Test whether high-risk findings have owners, milestones, escalation, effectiveness testing, and documented closure [Reports 26, 33, 56].
- Test beneficiary-protection oversight records. Sample network reviews, parity analyses, denials, grievances, and provider reviews for source-data completeness, supervisory review, deficiency documentation, timely corrective action, and trend analysis [Reports 9, 39, 43, 112, 123].
- Verify incentive-payment use and outcomes. For each payment, test contractual permissible use, measurable milestone, expenditure support, reported result, and independent monitoring [Report 104].
- Test procurement-file completeness before award. Verify that every evaluator submitted required conflict-of-interest, nondisclosure, and nepotism forms before participation; inspect exception handling and supervisory review [Report 114].
- Which eligibility-event matches remain unresolved beyond policy timeframes, and how many generated capitation payments after the event date?
- Can the agency demonstrate that every closed eligibility case was evaluated for retroactive premium recovery?
- Are MLR, encounter, pharmacy benefit manager, and financial-statistical-report data sufficiently complete to support rate-setting and remittance decisions?
- Which corrective actions are overdue, and has anyone tested whether completed actions actually changed payment or access outcomes?
- Do network, parity, denial, grievance, and service-review data identify recurring barriers by plan, geography, service type, or beneficiary group?
- Can every incentive payment be traced to measurable beneficiary outcomes and supported expenditures?
This review draws on 36 of the 108 active reports in the database, covering California, Florida, Illinois, Louisiana, Maryland, Missouri, New York, Texas, Washington, and federal reviews, published between 2018 and 2025. Findings were supplied for 35 of the 36 scoped reports.
The scoped findings are not statistically representative of all Medicaid programs. Financial values should be read in their stated context: some are confirmed findings, while others are estimates, program costs, payment volumes, or potential exposures requiring further verification. The evidence bundle does not establish whether agencies have since remediated the cited conditions.
Evidence register
Sources referenced
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- REPORT 7
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- REPORT 11
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- REPORT 33
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- REPORT 53
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- REPORT 79
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- REPORT 84
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- REPORT 104
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- REPORT 112
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- REPORT 114
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- REPORT 118
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- REPORT 119
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- REPORT 121
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- REPORT 123
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- REPORT 124